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Abstract. We study the problem of formal verification of Binarized
Neural Networks (BNN), which have recently been proposed as a energy-
efficient alternative to traditional learning networks. The verification of
BNNs, using the reduction to hardware verification, can be even more
scalable by factoring computations among neurons within the same layer.
By proving the NP-hardness of finding optimal factoring as well as the
hardness of PTAS approximability, we design polynomial-time search
heuristics to generate factoring solutions. The overall framework allows
applying verification techniques to moderately-sized BNNs for embedded
devices with thousands of neurons and inputs.
Key words: hardware verification, artificial neural networks, formal
methods, safety
1 Introduction
Artificial neural networks have become essential building blocks in realizing
many automated and even autonomous systems. They have successfully been
deployed, for example, for perception and scene understanding [17, 21, 26], for
control and decision making [7, 14, 19, 29], and also for end-to-end solutions of
autonomous driving scenarios [5]. Implementations of artificial neural networks,
however, need to be made much more power-efficient in order to deploy them
on typical embedded devices with their characteristically limited resources and
power constraints. Moreover, the use of neural networks in safety-critical systems
poses severe verification and certification challenges [3].
Binarized Neural Networks (BNN) have recently been proposed [9, 16] as
a potentially much more power-efficient alternative to more traditional feed-
forward artificial neural networks. Their main characteristics are that trained
weights, inputs, intermediate signals and outputs, and also activation constraints
are binary-valued. Consequently, forward propagation only relies on bit-level
arithmetic. Since BNNs have also demonstrated good performance on standard
datasets in image recognition such as MNIST, CIFAR-10 and SVHN [9], they are
an attractive and potentially power-efficient alternative to current floating-point
based implementations of neural networks for embedded applications.
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In this paper we study the verification problem for BNNs. Given a trained
BNN and a specification of its intended input-output behavior, we develop verifi-
cation procedures for establishing that the given BNN indeed meets its intended
specification for all possible inputs. Notice that naively solving verification prob-
lems for BNNs with, say, 1000 inputs requires investigation of all 21000 different
input configurations.
For solving the verification problem of BNNs we build on well-known meth-
ods and tools from the hardware verification domain. We first transform the
BNN and its specification into a combinational miter [6], which is then trans-
formed into a corresponding propositional satisfiability (SAT) problem. In this
process we rely heavily on logic synthesis tools such as ABC [6] from the hardware
verification domain. Using such a direct neuron-to-circuit encoding, however, we
were not able to verify BNNs with thousands of inputs and hidden nodes, as
encountered in some of our embedded systems case studies. The main challenge
therefore is to make the basic verification procedure scale to BNNs as used on
current embedded devices.
It turns out that one critical ingredient for efficient BNN verification is to
factor computations among neurons in the same layer, which is possible due to
weights being binary. Such a technique is not applicable within recent works in
verification of floating point neural networks [8, 10, 15, 20, 25]. The key theorem
regarding the hardness of finding optimal factoring as well as the hardness of
inapproximability leads to the design of polynomial time search heuristics for
generating factorings. These factorings substantially increase the scalability of
formal verification via SAT solving.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines basic notions and con-
cepts underlying BNNs. Section 3 presents our verification workflow including
the factoring of counting units (Section 3.2). We summarize experimental results
with our verification procedure in Section 4, compare our results with related
work from the literature in Section 5, and we close with some final remarks and
an outlook in Section 6. Proofs of theorems are listed in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Let B be the set of bipolar binaries ±1, where +1 is interpreted as true and
−1 as false. A Binarized Neural Network (BNN) [9,16] consists of a sequence of
layers labeled from l = 0, 1, . . . , L, where 0 is the index of the input layer, L is
the output layer, and all other layers are so-called hidden layers. Superscripts (l)
are used to index layer l-specific variables. Elements of both inputs and outputs
vectors of a BNN are of bipolar domain B.
Layers l are comprised of nodes n
(l)
i (so-called neurons), for i = 0, 1, . . . , d
(l),
where d(l) is the dimension of the layer l. By convention, n
(l)
0 is a bias node and
has constant bipolar output +1. Nodes n
(l−1)
j of layer l − 1 can be connected
with nodes n
(l)
i in layer l by a directed edge of weight w
(l)
ji ∈ B. A layer is fully
connected if every node (apart from the bias node) in the layer is connected to all
index j 0 (bias node) 1 2 3 4
x
(l−1)
j +1 (constant) +1 -1 +1 +1
w
(l)
ji -1 (bias) +1 -1 -1 +1
x
(l−1)
j w
(l)
ji -1 +1 +1 -1 +1
im
(l)
i (−1) + (+1) + (+1) + (−1) + (+1) = 1
x
(l)
i +1, as im
(l)
i > 0
index j 0 (bias node) 1 2 3 4
x
(l−1)
j 1 1 0 1 1
w
(l)
ji 0 (bias) 1 0 0 1
x
(l−1)
j ⊕w(l)ji 0 1 1 0 1
# of 1’s in x
(l−1)
j ⊕w(l)ji 3
x
(l)
i 1, as (3 ≥ d 52e)
Table 1. An example of computing the output of a BNN neuron, using bipolar domain
(up) and using 0/1 boolean variables (down).
neurons in the previous layer. Let w
(l)
i denote the array of all weights associated
with neuron n
(l)
i . Notice that we consider all weights in a network to have fixed
bipolar values.
Given an input to the network, computations are applied successively from
neurons in layer 1 to L for generating outputs. Fig. 1 illustrates the computations
of a neuron in bipolar domain. Overall, the activation function is applied to the
intermediately computed weighted sum. It outputs +1 if the weighted sum is
greater or equal to 0; otherwise, output −1. For the output layer, the activation
function is omitted. For l = 1, . . . , L let x
(l)
i denote the output value of node n
(l)
i
and x(l) ∈ B|d(l)|+1 denotes the array of all outputs from layer l, including the
constant bias node; x(0) refers to the input layer.
For a given BNN and a relation φrisk specifying the undesired property be-
tween the bipolar input and output domains of the given BNN, the BNN safety
verification problem asks if there exists an input a to the BNN such that the
risk property φrisk(a, b) holds, where b is the output of the BNN for input a.
It turns out that safety verification of BNN is no simpler than safety ver-
ification of floating point neural networks with ReLU activation function [15].
Nevertheless, compared to floating point neural networks, the simplicity of bina-
rized weights allows an efficient translation into SAT problems, as can be seen
in later sections.
Theorem 1. The problem of BNN safety verification is NP-complete.
3 Verification of BNNs via Hardware Verification
The BNN verification problem is encoded by means of a combinational miter [6],
which is a hardware circuit with only one Boolean output and the output should
n
(l)
i
w
(l)
0i
w
(l)
1i
w
(l)
dl−1i
x
(l−1)
0 = +1
x
(l)
i
x
(l)
i = (im
(l)
i ≥ 0) ?+1 : -1
im
(l)
i =
∑d(l−1)
j=0
w
(l)
ji x
(l−1)
j
node structure
input-output function under ±1
where
x
(l−1)
1
x
(l−1)
dl−1
x
(l)
i =
∑d(l−1)
j=0
w
(l)
ji x
(l−1)
j
l = Ll < L (hidden layer) (output layer)
Fig. 1. Computation inside a neuron of a BNN, under bipolar domain ±1.
always be 0. The main step of this encoding is to replace the bipolar domain
operation in the definition of BNNs with corresponding operations in the 0/1
Boolean domain.
We recall the encoding of the update function of an individual neuron of
a BNN in bipolar domain (Eq. 1) by means of operations in the 0/1 Boolean
domain [9,16]: (1) perform a bitwise XNOR (⊕) operation, (2) count the number
of 1s, and (3) check if the sum is greater than or equal to the half of the number of
inputs being connected. Table 1 illustrates the concept by providing the detailed
computation for a neuron connected to five predecessor nodes. Therefore, the
update function of a BNN neuron (in the fully connected layer) in the Boolean
domain is as follows.
x
(l)
i = geq
⌈
|d(l−1)|+1
2
⌉(count1(w(l)i ⊕x(l−1))) , (1)
where count1 simply counts the number of 1s in an array of Boolean variables,
and geq⌈ |d(l−1)|+1
2
⌉(x) is 1 if x ≥ ⌈ |d(l−1)|+12 ⌉, and 0 otherwise. Notice that the
value
⌈ |d(l−1)|+1
2
⌉
is constant for a given BNN.
Specifications in the bipolar domain can also be easily re-encoded in the
Boolean domain. Let (x
(L)
i )±1 be the valuation in the bipolar domain and (x
(L)
i )0/1
be the output valuation in the Boolean domain; then the transformation from
bipolar to Boolean domain is as follows.
(x
(L)
i )±1 = 2 · (x(L)i )0/1 − d(L−1) (2)
An illustrative example is provided in Table 1, where im
(l)
i = 1 = 2 · 3 − 5. In
the remaining of this paper we assume that properties are always provided in
the Boolean domain.
3.1 From BNN to hardware verification
We are now ready for stating the basic decision procedure for solving BNN
verification problems. This procedure first constructs a combinational miter for
a BNN verification problem, followed by an encoding of the combinational miter
into a corresponding propositional SAT problem. Here we rely on standard trans-
formation techniques as implemented in logic synthesis tools such as ABC [6] or
Yosys [30] for constructing SAT problems from miters. The decision procedure
takes as input a BNN network description, an input-output specification φrisk
and can be summarized by the following workflow:
1. Transform all neurons of the given BNN into neuron-modules. All neuron-
modules have identical structure, but only differ based on the associated
weights and biases of the corresponding neurons.
2. Create a BNN-module by wiring the neuron-modules realizing the topologi-
cal structure of the given BNN.
3. Create a property-module for the property φrisk. Connect the inputs of this
module with all the inputs and all the outputs of the BNN-module. The
output of this module is true if the property is satisfied and false otherwise.
4. The combination of the BNN-module and the property-module is the miter.
5. Transform the miter into a propositional SAT formula.
6. Solve the SAT formula. If it is unsatisfiable then the BNN is safe w.r.t. φrisk;
if it is satisfiable then the BNN exhibits the risky behavior being specified
in φrisk.
3.2 Counting optimization
The goal of the counting optimization is to speed up SAT-solving times by
reusing redundant counting units in the circuit and, thus, reducing redundancies
in the SAT formula. This method involves the identification and factoring of
redundant counting units, illustrated in Figure 2, which highlights one possible
factoring. The main idea is to exploit similarities among the weight vectors
of neurons in the same layer, because the counting over a portion of the weight
vector has the same result for all neurons that share it. The circuit size is reduced
by using the factored counting unit in multiple neuron-modules. We define a
factoring as follows:
Definition 1 (factoring and saving). Consider the l-th layer of a BNN where
l > 0. A factoring f = (I, J) is a pair of two sets, where I ⊆ {1, . . . , d(l)},
J ⊆ {1, . . . , d(l−1)}, such that |I| > 1, and for all i1, i2 ∈ I, for all j ∈ J ,
we have w
(l)
ji1
= w
(l)
ji2
. Given a factoring f = (I, J), define its saving sav(f) be
(|I| − 1) · |J |.
Definition 2 (non-overlapping factorings). Two factorings f1 = (I1, J1) and
f2 = (I2, J2) are non-overlapping when the following condition folds: if (i1, j1) ∈
f1 and (i2, j2) ∈ f2, then either i1 6= i2 or j1 6= j2. In other words, weights
associated with f1 and f2 do not overlap.
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Fig. 2. One possible factoring to avoid redundant counting.
Definition 3 (k-factoring optimization problem). The k-factoring optimization
problem searches for a set F of size k factorings {f1, . . . , fk}, such that any two
factorings are non-overlapping, and the total saving sav(f1) + · · · + sav(fk) is
maximum.
For the example in Fig. 2, there are two non-overlapping factorings f1 = ({1, 2}, {0, 2})
and f2 = ({2, 3}, {1, 3, 4, 5}). {f1, f2} is also an optimal solution for the 2-
factoring optimization problem, with the total saving being (2−1)·2+(2−1)·4 =
6. Even finding one factoring f1 which has the overall maximum saving sav(f1),
is computationally hard. This NP-hardness result is established by a reduction
from the NP-complete problem of finding maximum edge biclique in bipartite
graphs [24].
Theorem 2 (Hardness of factoring optimization). The k-factoring optimization
problem, even when k = 1, is NP-hard.
Furthermore, even having an approximation algorithm for the k-factoring opti-
mization problem is hard - there is no polynomial time approximation scheme
(PTAS), unless NP-complete problems can be solved in randomized subexpo-
nential time. The proof follows an intuition that building a PTAS for 1-factoring
can be used to build a PTAS for finding maximum complete bipartite subgraph
which also has known inapproximability results [1].
Algorithm 1: Finding factoring possibilities for BNN.
Data: BNN network description (cf Sec. 2)
Result: Set F of factorings, where any two factorings of F are non-overlapping.
1 function main():
2 let used := ∅ and F := ∅;
3 foreach neuron n
(l)
i do
4 let fopti := empty factoring;
5 foreach weight w
(l)
ji where (i, j) 6∈ used do
6 fij = getFactoring(i, j, used);
7 if sav(fij) > sav(f
opt
i ) then f
opt
i := fij ;
8 used := used ∪ {(i, j) | (i, j) ∈ fopti }; F := F ∪ {fopti };
9 return F ;
10 function getFactoring(i, j, used):
11 build I := {I0, ..., Id(l−1)} where Ij′ :=
{i′ ∈ {0, ..., d(l)} ∣∣ w(l)j′i′ = w(l)j′i ∧ (i′, j′) 6∈ used};
12 foreach Im ∈ I do Im := Im⋂ Ij ;
13 build J := {J0, . . . , Jj′ , . . . , Jd(l−1)} where Jj′ :=
{j′′ ∈ {0, ..., d(l−1)} ∣∣ Ij′ ⊆ Ij′′};
14 return (I, J) := (Ij∗ , Jj∗) where Ij∗ ∈ I, Jj∗ ∈ J, and
(|Ij∗ | − 1) · |Jj∗ | = maxj′∈{0,...,d(l−1)} (|I ′j | − 1) · |J ′j | ;
Theorem 3. Let  > 0 be an arbitrarily small constant. If there is a PTAS
for the k-factoring optimization problem, even when k = 1, then there is a
(probabilistic) algorithm that decides whether a given SAT instance of size n
is satisfiable in time 2n

.
As finding an optimal factoring is computationally hard, we present a polynomial
time heuristic algorithm (Algorithm 1) that finds factoring possibilities among
neurons in layer l. The main function searches for an unused pair of neuron i and
input j (line 3 and 5), considers a certain set of factorings determined by the
subroutine getFactoring (line 6) where weight w
(l)
ji is guaranteed to be used (as
input parameter i, j), picks the factoring with greatest sav() (line 7) and then
adds the factoring greedily and updates the set used (line 8).
The subroutine getFactoring() (lines 10–14) computes a factoring (I, J)
guaranteeing that weight w
(l)
ji is used. It starts by creating a set I, where each
element Ij′ ∈ I is a set containing the indices of neurons whose j′-th weight
matches the j′-th weight in neuron i (the condition (w(l)j′i′ = w
(l)
j′i) in line 11). In
the example in Fig. 3a, the computation generates Fig. 3b where I3 = {1, 2, 3}
as w
(l)
31 = w
(l)
32 = w
(l)
33 = 0. The intersection performed on line 12 guarantees
that the set Ij′ is always a subset of Ij – as weight wji should be included, Ij
already defines the maximum set of neurons where factoring can happen. E.g.,
I3 changes from {1, 2, 3} to {1, 2} in Fig. 3c.
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Fig. 3. Executing getFactoring(1, 0, ∅), meaning that we consider a factoring which
includes the top-left corner of (a). The returned factoring is highlighted in thick lines.
The algorithm then builds a set J of all the candidates for J . Each element
Jj′ contains all the inputs j
′′ that would benefit from Ij′ being the final result
I. Based on the observation mentioned above, Jj′ can be built through superset
computation between elements of I (line 13, Fig. 3d). After we build I and J,
finally line 14 finds a pair of (Ij∗ , Jj∗) where Ij∗ ∈ I, Jj∗ ∈ J with the maximum
saving (|I∗j |−1)·|J∗j |. The maximum saving as produced in Fig. 3 equals (|{1, 2}|−
1) · |{0, 2, 3}| = 3.
There are only polynomial operations in this algorithm such as nested for
loops, superset checking and intersection which makes the heuristic algorithm
polynomial. When one encounters a huge number of neurons and long weight
vectors, we further partition neurons and weights into smaller regions as input to
Algorithm 1. By doing so, we find factoring possibilities for each weight segment
of a neuron and the algorithm can be executed in parallel.
4 Implementation and Evaluation
We have created a verification tool, which first reads a BNN description
based on the Intel Nervana Neon framework1, generates a combinational miter
in Verilog and calls Yosys [30] and ABC [6] for generating a CNF formula. No fur-
ther optimization commands (e.g., refactor) are executed inside ABC to create
smaller CNFs. Finally, Cryptominisat5 [27] is used for solving SAT queries. The
experiments are conducted in a Ubuntu 16.04 Google Cloud VM equipped with
18 cores and 250 GB RAM, with Cryptominisat5 running with 16 threads. We
use two different datasets, namely the MNIST dataset for digit recognition [18]
and the German traffic sign dataset [28]. We binarize the gray scale data to ±1
before actual training. For the traffic sign dataset, every pixel is quantized to 3
Boolean variables.
Table 2 summarizes the result of verification in terms of SAT solving time,
with a timeout set to 90 minutes. The properties that we use here are char-
1 https://github.com/NervanaSystems/neon/tree/master/examples/binary
ID # in-
puts
# neurons
hidden layer
Properties being investigated SAT/
UNSAT
SAT solving
time (normal)
SAT solving
time (factored)
MNIST 1 784 3x100 out1 ≥ 18 ∧ out2 ≥ 18 (≥ 18%) SAT 2m16.336s 0m53.545s
MNIST 1 784 3x100 out1 ≥ 30 ∧ out2 ≥ 30 (≥ 30%) SAT 2m20.318s 0m56.538s
MNIST 1 784 3x100 out1 ≥ 60 ∧ out2 ≥ 60 (≥ 60%) SAT timeout 10m50.157s
MNIST 1 784 3x100 out1 ≥ 90 ∧ out2 ≥ 90 (≥ 90%) UNSAT 2m4.746s 1m0.419s
Traffic 2 2352 3x500 out1 ≥ 90 ∧ out2 ≥ 90 (≥ 18%) SAT 10m27.960s 4m9.363s
Traffic 2 2352 3x500 out1 ≥ 150∧ out2 ≥ 150 (≥ 30%) SAT 10m46.648s 4m51.507s
Traffic 2 2352 3x500 out1 ≥ 200∧ out2 ≥ 200 (≥ 40%) SAT 10m48.422s 4m19.296s
Traffic 2 2352 3x500 out1 ≥ 300∧ out2 ≥ 300 (≥ 60%) unknown timeout timeout
Traffic 2 2352 3x500 out1 ≥ 475∧ out2 ≥ 475 (≥ 95%) UNSAT 31m24.842s 41m9.407s
Traffic 3 2352 3x1000 out1 ≥ 120∧ out2 ≥ 120 (≥ 12%) SAT out-of-memory 9m40.77s
Traffic 3 2352 3x1000 out1 ≥ 180∧ out2 ≥ 180 (≥ 18%) SAT out-of-memory 9m43.70s
Traffic 3 2352 3x1000 out1 ≥ 300∧ out2 ≥ 300 (≥ 30%) SAT out-of-memory 9m28.40s
Traffic 3 2352 3x1000 out1 ≥ 400∧ out2 ≥ 400 (≥ 40%) SAT out-of-memory 9m34.95s
Table 2. Verification results for each instance and comparing the execution times of
the plain hardware verification approach and the optimized version using counting
optimizations.
acteristics of a BNN given by numerical constraints over outputs, such as “si-
multaneously classify an image as a priority road sign and as a stop sign with
high confidence” (which clearly demonstrates a risk behavior). It turns out that
factoring techniques are essential to enable better scalability, as it halves the
verification times in most cases and enables us to solve some instances where
the plain approach ran out of memory or timed out. However, we also observe
that solvers like Cryptominisat5 might get trapped in some very hard-to-prove
properties. Regarding the instance in Table 2 where the result is unknown, we
suspect that the simultaneous confidence value of 60% for the two classes out1
and out2, is close to the value where the property flips from satisfiable to unsat-
isfiable. This makes SAT solving on such cases extremely difficult for solvers as
the instances are close to the “border” between SAT and UNSAT instances.
Here we omit technical details, but the counting approach can also be re-
placed by techniques such as sorting networks2 [2] where the technique of factor-
ing can still be integrated3. However, our initial evaluation demonstrated that
using sorting network does not bring any computational benefit.
5 Related Work
There has been a flurry of recent results on formal verification of neural
networks (e.g. [8, 10, 15, 20, 25]). These approaches usually target the formal
verification of floating-point arithmetic neural networks (FPA-NNs). Huang et
2 Intuitively, the counting + activation function can be replaced by implementing a
sorting network and check if for the m sorted result, the m
2
-th element is true.
3 Sorting network in [2] implements merge-sort in hardware, where the algorithm tries
to build a sorted string via merging multiple sorted substrings. Under the context
of BNN verification, the factored result can be first sorted, then these sorted results
can then be integrated as an input to the merger.
al. propose an (incomplete) search-based technique based on satisfiability mod-
ulo theories (SMT) solvers [13]. For FPA-NNs with ReLU activation functions,
Katz et al. propose a modification of the Simplex algorithm which prefers fixing
of binary variables [15]. This verification approach has been demonstrated on
the verification of a collision avoidance system for UAVs. In our own previous
work on neural network verification we establish maximum resilience bounds
for FPA-NNs based on reductions to mixed-integer linear programming (MILP)
problems [8]. The feasibility of this approach has work has demonstrated, for
example, by verifying a motion predictor in a highway overtaking scenario. The
work of Ehlers [10] is based on sound abstractions, and approximates non-linear
behavior in the activation functions. Scalability is the overarching challenge for
these formal approaches to the verification of FPA-NNs. Case studies and ex-
periments reported in the literature are usually restricted to the verification of
FPA-NNs with a couple of hundred neurons.
Around the time (Oct 9th, 2017) we first release of our work regarding for-
mal verification of BNNs, Narodytska et al have also worked on the same prob-
lem [23]. Their work focuses on efficient encoding within a single neuron, while
we focus on computational savings among neurons within the same layer. One
can view our result and their result complementary.
Researchers from the machine learning domain (e.g. [11, 12, 22]) target the
generation of adversarial examples for debugging and retraining purposes. Ad-
verserial examples are slightly perturbed inputs (such as images) which may
fool a neural network into generating undesirable results (such as ”wrong” clas-
sifications). Using satisfiability assignments from the SAT solving stage in our
verification procedure, we are also able to generate counterexamples to the BNN
verification problem. Our work, however, goes well beyond current approaches
to generating adverserial examples in that it does not only support debugging
and retraining purposes. Instead, our verification algorithm establishes formal
correctness results for neural network-like structures.
6 Conclusions
We are solving the problem of verifying BNNs by reduction to the problem of
verifying combinatorial circuits, which itself is reduced to solving SAT problems.
Altogether, our experiments indicate that this hardware verification-centric ap-
proach, in connection with our BNN-specific transformations and optimizations,
scales to BNNs with thousands of inputs and nodes. This kind of scalability
makes our verification approach attractive for automatically establishing cor-
rectness results at least for moderately-sized BNNs as used on current embedded
devices.
Our developments for efficiently encoding BNN verification problems, how-
ever, might also prove to be useful in optimizing forward evaluation of BNNs.
In addition our verification framework may also be used for debugging and re-
training purposes of BNNs; for example, for automatically generating adverserial
inputs from failed verification attempts.
In the future we also plan to directly synthesize propositional clauses without
the support of 3rd party tools such as Yosys in order to avoid extraneous trans-
formations and repetitive work in the synthesis workflow. Similar optimizations
of the current verification tool chain should result in substantial performance
improvements. It might also be interesting to investigate incremental verifica-
tion techniques for BNN, since weights and structure of these learning networks
might adapt and change continuously.
Finally, our proposed verification workflow might be extended to synthesis
problems, such as synthesizing bias terms in BNNs without sacrificing perfor-
mance or for synthesizing weight assignments in a property-driven manner. These
kinds of synthesis problems for BNNs are reduced to 2QBF problems, which are
satisfiability problems with a top level exists-forall quantification. The main
challenge for solving these kinds of synthesis problems for the typical networks
encountered in practice is, again, scalability.
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Appendix - Proof of Theorems
Theorem 1. The problem of BNN safety verification is NP-complete.
Proof. Recall that for a given BNN and a relation φrisk specifying the undesired
property between the bipolar input and output domains of the given BNN, the
BNN safety verification problem asks if there exists an input a to the BNN such
that the risk property φrisk(a, b) holds, where b is the output of the BNN for
input a.
(NP) Given an input, compute the output and check if φrisk(a, b) holds can easily
be done in time linear to the size of BNN and size of the property formula.
(NP-hardness) The NP-hardness proof is via a reduction from 3SAT to BNN
safety verification. Consider variables x1, . . . , xm, clauses c1, . . . , cn where for
each clause cj , it has three literals lj1 , lj2 , lj3 . We build a single layer BNN with
inputs to be x0 = +1 (constant for bias), x1, . . . , xm, xm+1 (from CNF variables),
connected to n neurons.
For neuron n1j , its weights and connection to previous layers is decided by
clause cj .
– If lj1 is a positive literal xi, then in BNN create a link from xi to neuron n
1
j
with weight −1. If lj1 is a negative literal xi, then in BNN create a link from
xi to neuron n
1
j with weight +1. Proceed analogously for lj2 and lj3 .
– Add an edge from xm+1 to n
1
j with weight −1.
– Add a bias term −1.
For example, consider the CNF having variables x1, . . . , x6, then the trans-
lation of the clause (x3 ∨ ¬x5 ∨ x6) will create in BNN the weighted sum com-
putation (−x3 + x5 − x6)− x7 − 1.
Assume that x7 is constant +1, then if there exists any assignment to make
the clause (x3∨¬x5∨x6) true, then by interpreting the true assignment in CNF
to be +1 in the BNN input and false assignment in CNF to be −1 in the BNN
input, the weighted sum is at most −1, i.e., the output of the neuron is −1. Only
when x3 = false, x5 = true and x6 = false (i.e., the assignment makes the clause
unsatisfiable), then the weighed sum is +1, thereby setting output of the neuron
to be +1.
Following the above exemplary observation, it is easy to derive that 3SAT
formula is satisfiable iff in the generated BNN, there exists an input such that
the risk property φrisk := (xm+1 = +1→ (
∧n
i=1 x
(1)
i = −1)) holds. It is done by
interpreting the 3SAT variable assignment xi := true in CNF to be assignment
+1 for input xi in the BNN, while interpreting xi := false in 3SAT to be −1 for
input xi in the BNN.
Theorem 2 (Hardness of factoring optimization). The k-factoring optimization
problem, even when k = 1, is NP-hard.
Proof. The proof proceeds by a polynomial reduction from the problem of finding
maximum edge biclique in bipartite graphs [24]4. Given a bipartite graph G, this
reduction is defined as follows.
1. For v1α, the α-th element of V1, create a neuron n
(l)
α .
2. Create an additional neuron n
(l)
δ
3. For v2β , the β-th element of V2, create a neuron n
(l−1)
β .
– Create weight w
(l)
βδ = 1.
– If (v1, v2) ∈ E, then create w(l)βα = 1.
This construction can clearly be performed in polynomial time. Figure 4 il-
lustrates the construction process. It is not difficult to observe that G has a
maximum edge size κ biclique {A;B} iff the neural network at layer l has a fac-
toring (I, J) whose saving equals (|I| − 1) · |J | = κ. The gray area in Figure 4-a
shows the structure of maximum edge biclique {{1, 2}; {6, 8}}. For Figure 4-c,
the saving is (|{n(l)δ , n(l)2 , n(l)3 }| − 1) · 2 = 4, which is the same as the edge size of
the biclique.
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Fig. 4. From bipartite graph (a) to BNN where all weights are with value 1 (b), to
optimal factoring (c).
4 Let G = (V1, V2, E) be a bipartite graph with vertex set V1 unionmulti V2 and edge set E
connecting vertices in V1 to vertices in V2. A pair of two disjoint subsets A ∈ V1
and B ∈ V2 is called a biclique if (a, b) ∈ E for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B. Thus, the
edges {(a, b)} form a complete bipartite subgraph of G. A biclique {A;B} clearly
has |A| · |B| edges.
The following inapproximability result shows that even having an approxi-
mation algorithm for the k-factoring optimization problem is hard.
Theorem 3. Let  > 0 be an arbitrarily small constant. If there is a PTAS
for the k-factoring optimization problem, even when k = 1, then there is a
(probabilistic) algorithm that decides whether a given SAT instance of size n
is satisfiable in time 2n

.
Proof. We will prove the Theorem by showing that a PTAS for the k-factoring
optimization problem can be used to manufacture a PTAS for MEB. Then the
result follows from the inapproximability of MEB assuming the exponential time
hypothesis [1].
Assume that A is a ρ-approximation algorithm for the k-factoring optimiza-
tion problem. We formulate the following algorithm B:
Input: MEB instance M (a bipartite graph G = (V,E))
Output: a biclique in G
1. perform reduction of proof of Theorem 1 to obtain k-factoring instance F :=
reduce(M)
2. factoring (I, J) := A(F )
3. return (I \ {n(l)δ }, J)
Remark: step 3 is a small abuse of notation. It should return the original vertices corresponding to these neurons.
Now we prove that B is a ρ-approximation algorithm for MEB: Note that by our
reduction two corresponding MEB and k-factoring instances M and F have the
same optimal value, i.e., Opt(M) = Opt(F ).
In step 3 the algorithm returns (I \ {n(l)δ }, J). This is valid since we can
assume w.l.o.g. that I returned by A contains n(l)δ . This neuron is connected to
all neurons from the previous layer by construction, so it can be added to any
factoring. The following relation holds for the number of edges in the biclique
returned by B:
‖I \ {n(l)δ }‖ · ‖J‖ = (‖I‖ − 1) · ‖J‖ (3a)
≥ ρ ·Opt(F ) (3b)
= ρ ·Opt(M) (3c)
The inequality in step (3b) holds by the assumption thatA is a ρ-approximation
algorithm for k-factoring and (3c) follows from the construction of our reduction.
Equations (3) and the result of [1] imply Theorem 2.
